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Abstract
Over the past several decades, technology has continued to develop at an incredible rate, and the
importance of properly securing information has increased significantly. While a variety of
encryption schemes currently exist for this purpose, a number of them rely on problems, such as
integer factorization, that are not resistant to quantum algorithms. With the reality of quantum
computers approaching, it is critical that a quantum-resistant method of protecting information is
found. After developing the proper background, we evaluate the potential of the McEliece
cryptosystem for use in the post-quantum era by examining families of algebraic geometry codes
that allow for increased security. Finally, we develop a family of twisted Hermitian codes that
meets the criteria set forth for security.
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Codes, Cryptography, and the McEliece Cryptosystem
Introduction
In 1978, Robert McEliece introduced a public key cryptosystem based on the difficult
problem of decoding a random linear code. Due to its large key size, the McEliece cryptosystem
has yet to see widespread use. However, since the McEliece cryptosystem does not appear to be
susceptible to Shor’s algorithm as is the case with the widely used RSA and elliptic curve
cryptosystems, it is now being considered as a candidate for post-quantum cryptography.
Ultimately, we desire a code with a Schur square that behaves like that of a random linear code,
meaning the dimension of its Schur square is equal to that of a random linear code of the same
dimension. Because most classical families of codes fall far short of this ideal, we develop a
family of twisted Hermitian codes with a Schur square dimension comparable to that of random
linear code. We show that, when constructed properly, these twisted Hermitian codes not only
achieve a high dimensional Schur square but also maintain a reasonable data transfer rate. The
twisted construction is a variant of that considered by Peter Beelen, Martin Bossert, Sven
Puchinger, and Johan Rosenkilde (2018) and is joint work with Austin Allen, Keller Blackwell,
Olivia Fiol, Rutuja Kshirsagar, Gretchen Matthews, and Zoe Nelson.
Mathematical Background
In order to effectively discuss coding theory, we introduce several important concepts
from linear algebra, specifically relating to vector spaces. Vector spaces are foundational to linear
algebra and have innumerous applications. However, considering specific subsets of vector
spaces that conform to the same basic properties is also incredibly valuable. One such subset is
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the span of a given set of vectors.
Definition 1. Let S = {v1, . . . , vn} ⊂ Fn be a finite set of n-vectors. Then span(S) is the set of all
linear combinations formed from vectors in S:
span{v1, . . . , vn} =
{ n∑
i=1
civi | ci ∈ F for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
}
.
LetW = span(S). We say that S is a generating set or spanning set forW (Curtis, 1984).
Given a set of vectors, it is also important to determine whether or not one vector can be
written as a linear combination of the other vectors in the set.
Definition 2. Let S ⊆ Fn. If there is some vector v ∈ S such that v can be written as a finite linear
combination of the other vectors in S, then we say that S is linearly dependent. If not, then S is
said to be linearly independent.
Determining the minimum number of linearly independent vectors needed to span a given vector
space leads to the notion of a basis.
Definition 3. A basis for a vector space V over F is an ordered set of vectors S such that
1. V = span(S),
2. S is linearly independent.
Linear independence and bases are useful in a variety of contexts and are extremely relevant when
examining coding theory in greater depth.
Finally, we provide the definition of a linear transformation as stated by Curtis (1984).
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Definition 4. Let V andW be vector spaces over a field F. A linear transformation of V intoW is
a function T : V→ W which assigns to each vector v ∈ V a unique vector w = T(v) ∈ W such that
1. T(v1 + v2) = T(v1) + T(v2) for all v1, v2 ∈ V, and
2. T(αv) = αT(v) for all v ∈ V and α ∈ F.
Linear transformations play an important role in the development of codes and will later allow us
to define a family of codes known as linear codes.
Cryptography
Cryptography, at its core, deals with the sending and receiving of secret messages.
Functionally, cryptography has five main purposes:
1. Privacy: Ensuring that only the intended receiver can read the sent message.
2. Authentication: Proving the identity of the sender.
3. Integrity: Ensuring that the received message has not been altered in any way from the
original.
4. Non-repudiation: Proving that the sender truly sent the received message.
5. Key exchange: The way in which cryptographic keys are shared between the sender and the
receiver (Kessler, 2019).
Throughout history, cryptography has played an important role in both military affairs and
diplomatic endeavors (Conrad, 2013). However, as online activity increased during the late
twentieth century, the importance of cryptography to the general public increased significantly. In
CODES, CRYPTOGRAPHY, AND MCELIECE 7
the 1970s, techniques from number theory took cryptographic protocols into uncharted territory
by providing a way for two people to communicate secret messages under the assumption that all
of their communication is intercepted and read by an adversarial third party (Stein, 2017). Today,
this practice is known as public key cryptography.
Though originally developed by GCHQ, modern public key cryptography was first
introduced by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1976 (Diffie and Hellman, 1976). With the
Diffie-Hellman encryption scheme, two parties cooperatively establish a secret shared key over
an insecure channel. However, other systems allow for one-sided determination of the public and
private keys. In 1984, Taher ElGamal presented the ElGamal cryptosystem (ElGamal, 1984).
With this system, two parties had the ability to engage in secure communication over an
unsecured channel without having a shared secret key (Kessler, 2019). In such a scenario, both
the algorithm and the encryption key are made public for all users, but only those with a private
key ultimately have the ability to carry out the decryption process.
In order to implement a public key cryptosystem, we need two mathematically related
keys where knowledge of one key does not allow someone to easily determine the other key. To
accomplish this, we implement trapdoor functions. A trapdoor function is one that is simple to
compute on every input but difficult to invert given a random output without a secret key. In
mathematical terms, if f is a trapdoor function, then there exists some private information t so that,
given f(x) and t, it is relatively simple to compute x.
For example, the cryptographic protocol known as RSA depends on the ease of
multiplication paired with the computational complexity of factorization. Knowledge of an
extremely large number does not easily lead to knowledge of that number’s factors. Yet, the
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extremely difficult problem of factorization becomes trivial when the receiver has access to the
private key. Since its debut in 1977, RSA has seen widespread use and has been incredibly
effective. However, the development of quantum computers would render RSA useless. As such,
mathematicians and computer scientists now wish to uncover alternative methods based on some
other hard problem.
Quantum Computing
Quantum computers do not function in the same way as existing computers since they rely
on fundamentally different principles. Quantum computing takes advantage of the the ability of
subatomic particles to exist in more than one state at any time. Universal quantum computers
leverage this quantum mechanical phenomena to create states that scale exponentially with the
number of quantum bits. As such, they are particularly suited to solve large mathematical
problems.
For example, consider the problem of factoring very large numbers. Currently, enormous
integer factorization problems are believed to be computationally infeasible with a regular
computer. However, using Shor’s algorithm, a quantum computer could quickly and simply find
the desired factors. Shor’s algorithm, developed in 1994 by mathematician Peter Shor, is a
polynomial-time quantum computer algorithm for integer factorization (Gerjuoy, 2005). In
particular, given an integer N, the algorithm finds its prime factors, and it does so in
O((logN)2(log logN)(log log logN)) time. Compared to the most efficient classical factoring
algorithm, this is nearly exponentially faster.
Today, most public key systems are based on the difficulty of factoring integers or
computing discrete logarithms (Stinson & Paterson, 2019). Given that both of these can be solved
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by Shor’s algorithm, it is critical that cryptographic systems are developed that are resistant to
quantum algorithms. While experimental quantum computers do not currently have enough
processing power to truly break a cryptographic algorithm, cryptographers hope to design new
algorithms to prepare for when quantum computing becomes a realistic threat. Consequently, the
world of post-quantum cryptography has captured the attention of mathematicians and computer
scientists around the world as they seek to create algorithms that are thought to be secure against
attacks by quantum computers.
Recently, attention has been focused on cryptographic algorithms that are lattice-based,
hash-based, or code-based (Stinson & Paterson, 2019). After developing basic ideas in coding
theory, we discuss a cryptographic system based on error-correcting codes.
Coding Theory
Coding theory studies the properties of codes and their various applications. In coding
theory the goal is not to hide messages but to ensure that they pass through a noisy channel
without errors, i.e., to provide reliable communication. Codes are frequently used for data
transmission, data storage, error-correction, and cryptography.
In order to lay a foundation for working with codes in the context of cryptography, we
now make several definitions.
Definition 5. A code C of length n is defined to be a subset of An = A× A× ...× A (n copies)
where A is an appropriately chosen alphabet (Walker, 2000).
An alphabet is a finite set of symbols called letters. In the given context, let A = Fq where
Fq is a finite field with q elements, and q is prime or the power of a prime. If q is prime, then Zq is
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a model for Fq. If q = pt is a prime power, then Fq ∼= Zq[x]/〈p(x)〉 where p(x) is an irreducible
polynomial of degree t.
If C is a vector subspace of Fnq, then C is said to be a linear code. The vector space
structure of linear codes provides a known framework in which to work and allow specific
parameters to be determined with relative ease. Typically, the parameters studied are length,
dimension, and minimum distance.
First, we wish to define the minimum distance of a code. To do this, several ideas are
necessary. Note that we refer to elements of a code as codewords. In order to find the minimum
distance parameter, we need a method of determining distance between codewords.
Definition 6. For x = (x1, x2, ..., xn), y = (y1, y2, ..., yn) ∈ An, the Hamming distance between x
and y is
d(x, y) = #{i : xi ̸= yi}.
For x ∈ Fn, the Hamming weight of x is
wt(x) = d(x, 0) = #{i : xi ̸= 0}.
Given Definition 6, we now define the minimum distance parameter.
Definition 7. The minimum distance of a code C is
dmin = min{d(x, y) : x, y ∈ C and x ̸= y}.
If the meaning is clear from context, then the subscript may be omitted so that we simply use d to
refer to minimum distance. In the case that C is a linear code, we can compute the minimum
distance quite simply.
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Theorem 8. Assume C is a linear code. Then the minimum distance is equal to the minimum
weight, i.e.,
dmin = min{wt(x) : x ∈ C and x ̸= (0, 0, ..., 0)}.
With this definition in hand, we now include definitions for the remaining parameters.
Definition 9. Assuming C is a linear code, we define the length of a code C to be the dimension
of the ambient vector space Fnq. For C ⊆ Fnq, the length of C is n. We define the dimension, k, of C
to be the dimension of C as a vector space over Fq. If C is a linear code that, as a vector space over
Fq, has dimension k and minimum distance d, then we say that C is an [n, k, d] code.
One of the many benefits of working with linear codes is the ability to assign a basis to the
space of codewords. Since C is a vector space, there exist linearly independent codewords
c1, ..., ck ∈ C such that, for every c ∈ C, it follows that c = a1c1 + ...+ akck for some field
elements a1, ..., ak ∈ Fq. Consequently, there exists a matrix G such that every codeword is a
linear combination of the columns of G. We can write this matrix as
G =
[
c1 c2 . . . ck
]
,
where each codeword is of length n. The choice of G is not unique as any linearly independent set
of k codewords may be chosen to form the columns of G. Additionally, if C is a linear code over
Fq, then dmin(C) = wt(C). In other words, the minimum distance of a linear code is the smallest
weight of its non-zero codewords. As a result of all these things, the encoding and decoding
procedures for a linear code are faster and simpler than those for arbitrary non-linear codes.
To check whether or not a specific word belongs in a code, we use a parity-check matrix.
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Definition 10. A parity check matrix, H, of a linear code C is a generator matrix of the dual code,
C⊥. Thus, a codeword c is in C if and only if the matrix-vector product HcT = 0. For any row
vector x of the ambient vector space, the syndrome of x is given by s = HxT. The vector x is a
codeword if and only if s = 0.
In order to illustrate several of these ideas, we will consider the Hamming(7,4) code. Not
only can we use matrices to encode vectors, but we can also detect errors and correct them using
the parity-check matrix and syndrome.
Example 11. Let
G =

0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1

∈ F 7×42 ,
and let H be the parity-check matrix
H =

0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
 ∈ F
3×7
2 .
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Using G, we will encode the nybble (half-byte) 1111 as an element of F72:

0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1
1 1 0 1


1
1
1
1

=

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

.
Using the parity-check matrix and the syndrome, we are able to detect and pinpoint errors in the
encoded message. Suppose we introduce an error in position 2 of the encoded nybble. We then
have (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1). Multiplying this vector by H, we obtain the syndrome:

0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1


1
0
1
1
1
1
1

=

0
1
0
 .
Interpreting the syndrome as a 3-bit integer, we infer that we ought to correct position
0 · 22 + 1 · 21 + 0 · 20 = 2. Making this correction to the vector (1, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1), we obtain the
original codeword (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1). Thus, we can detect an error in the encoded nybble and use
the syndrome to retrieve the intended codeword.
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McEliece Public Key Cryptosystem
As previously discussed, several families of cryptosystems have been proposed to secure
communications in a quantum era, some of which are based on codes. In 1978, Robert McEliece
introduced the McEliece cryptosystem based on binary Goppa codes. In this system the public
key is an obfuscation of the underlying linear code, disguised to appear as a random code. The
private key is an efficient decoding algorithm for the underlying code. Overall, the security of the
McEliece cryptosystem is derived from the NP-hardness of decoding a random linear code.
Though the McEliece cryptosystem remains unbroken to this day (even with quantum algorithms),
its reliance on binary Goppa codes results in large key sizes that hinder practical implementation.
As a result, many variants of the McEliece cryptosystem have been introduced, with other linear
codes substituted within. Additional structure can lead to a reduction in key size but often at the
cost of introducing vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to extract identifying characteristics of
the underlying code from the public-key matrix. Once the attacker can identify the underlying
code, the fundamental assumption securing the McEliece cryptosystem is no longer valid.
We will now look at the structure of the McEliece cryptosystem and at how messages are
sent and received. Unlike RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, it does not rely on a
computational problem known to be susceptible to Shor’s algorithm.
Parameters
Let n, k, t ∈ N, and define an [n, k,≥ 2t+ 1] code C over Fq.
Key Generation
Let G ∈ Fk×nq be a generator matrix for the code C, S ∈ Fk×kq be an invertible matrix, and
P ∈ Fn×nq be a permutation matrix (i.e. has exactly one 1 in each row and each column). Set
CODES, CRYPTOGRAPHY, AND MCELIECE 15
Gpub = SGP ∈ Fk×nq . We then have (Gpub, t) as the public key and (S,DC,P) as the private key
where DC is the appropriate decoding algorithm.
Encryption
To send a private message m = (m1, ...,mk) ∈ Fkq, the vector m is encrypted as
m 7→ mGpub + z where z is a randomly chosen error vector of weight wt(z) ≤ t. The encrypted
message is then sent to the receiver.
Decryption
When w = mGpub + z = mSGP+ z is received, the receiver uses his or her public/private
key pair to decrypt the message. Multiplying by P−1, we obtain
wP−1 = (mGpub + z)P−1 = mSG+ zP−1.
Since wP−1 is viewed as a received word in the code, the decoding matrix can be applied. This
results in the matrix mS as Dc eliminates the error vector zP−1. Lastly, the receiver can multiply
by S−1 on the right to obtain the original message m.
As previously discussed, the security of the McEliece cryptosystem is rooted in the
problem of decoding a random linear code. Therefore, ideally, we desire a code that is highly
structured but keeps the matrix Gpub indistinguishable from a random matrix. To accomplish this,
the codes by which the generator matrix is determined must be chosen wisely. The concept of a
Schur Square is deeply related to this issue.
Definition 12. Let a,b ∈ Fn. The Schur product of vectors a and b is
a ∗ b = (a1b1, a2b2, ..., anbn).
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Since the the components of a and b are multiplied component-wise, we observe that a ∗ b ∈ Fn.
The Schur product is then used to define the Schur square of a given code.
Definition 13. Let C be an [n, k, d] code. The Schur square of C is
C2 = span{a ∗ b : a,b ∈ C}.
Interpreting the above definition, we see that the Schur square is simply the set of linear
combinations of a ∗ b where a,b ∈ C.
Applying this idea to the basis of a code, we have the following: If C ⊆ Fn has basis
{b1,b2, ..., bk}, then bi ∗ bj ∈ C2 for all i, j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k. Thus, C2 =
span{bi ∗ bj : 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k}. Since each element can be multiplied with every other element and
with itself, the largest possible dimension of C2 is
(k+1
2
)
. Given that C2 ⊆ Fn, its dimension cannot
exceed n. Consequently, dim C2 ≤ min{n, (k+12 )}.
Schur Squares and McEliece
We want Gpub to behave in the same way as a random code. If C is an [n, k, d] code chosen
at random from the set of all [n, k, d] codes over F with
(k+1
2
)
< n, then
Pr
[
dimC2 =
(
k+ 1
2
)]
= 1,
as determined by Pellikaan and Marquez-Corbella (2017). Therefore, if we desire Gpub to act as a
random code, then we want to choose families of codes such that dim C2 ≈ (k+12 ). While there are
many codes from which to choose, we will discuss two families of codes and their corresponding
variants.
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Reed-Solomon Codes and Variations
First, we will look at Reed-Solomon (RS) codes. Previously, we discussed the existence of
a finite field Fq with q = pm elements for any prime p and integer m ≥ 1. Reed-Solomon codes
are [n, k, d] linear codes constructed in such a finite field. Since they are constructed in Fq, their
length is limited to q. However, they are easily decoded and have a wide variety of uses
(Wootters, 2018). We will define standard Reed-Solomon Codes then will discuss a variant
proposed in 2017.
Reed-Solomon Codes
Definition 14. Label the q− 1 nonzero elements of Fq as α1, . . . , αn, and choose k ∈ Z so that
1 ≤ k ≤ n. Define Lk = {f ∈ Fq[x] : deg(f) ≤ k− 1}. Then the Reed-Solomon code is given by
Ck = {(f(α1), . . . , f(αn)) : f ∈ Lk}.
In order to simplify the expression for Ck, we write Ck = ev(Lk), where ev : Lk → Fq−1q is defined
by the mapping
f 7→ (f(α1), ..., f(αq−1)).
Notice that Ck is a subset of Fq−1q = Fq × · · · × Fq (q− 1 copies), so Ck is a code over the alphabet
Fq. Furthermore, since the map ev : Lk → Fq−1q is a linear transformation and Ck is its image, Ck is
a linear code (Walker, 2000). In order to better understand the basic construction of these codes,
consider the following example.
Example 15. Let q = 5 and k = 5. Then F5 = Z/5Z. Using the definition of Lk, we take each
f ∈ Z5[x] such that deg(f) ≤ 4. As a result, we have L5 = span{1, x, x2, x3, x4}. Evaluating this
basis, the code itself is given by C5 = ev(L5).
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Parameters. Given the definition of a Reed-Solomon code, we wish to determine its
basic parameters–length, dimension, and minimum distance. Recall that the length of a code
corresponds to the number of coordinates in each codeword. Here, each codeword is generated by
evaluating f at the n = q− 1 nonzero elements of Fq, so the length must be n = q− 1. Similarly,
the dimension is at most dimLk−1 = k. However, if ev(f) = ev(g), then f− g has at least q− 1
roots, so f− g has degree at least q− 1. But f− g ∈ Lk, which implies that f = g. Therefore, Ck
has dimension exactly k (Walker, 2000). Finally, we will find the minimum distance using the
minimum weight. Suppose f ∈ Lk−1 and wt(ev(f)) = dmin = d. Then f has at least n− d zeros, so
it has degree at least n− d. Since f ∈ Lk−1, this means that n− d ≤ k− 1, so d ≥ n− k+ 1. It
can be shown that Reed-Solomon codes also satisfy the Singleton Bound, i.e., d ≤ n− k+ 1.
Therefore, d = n− k+ 1. Any code with parameters that meet the Singleton Bound is called a
Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) code.
Schur square. We now consider the Schur square of standard Reed-Solomon codes. By
definition, the Schur square of a code C is given by C2 = span{a ∗ b : a,b ∈ C}. Applying this to
the Reed-Solomon code, we have
C2k = span{ev(f) ∗ ev(g) : f, g ∈ Lk} = span{(fg(α1), ..., fg(αn)) : f, g ∈ Lk}.
Recall that Lk = span{1, x, ..., xk−1}. As a result, a basis for the Schur square of a Reed-Solomon
code is given by L2k−1 = span{1, x, x2, . . . , x2k−2}.
Previously, we determined that a code is suitable for use in the McEliece cryptosystem if
dimC2 =
(k+1
2
)
. Here, dimC2 = 2k− 1 ≤ k(k+1)2 . Thus, standard Reed-Solomon codes do not
perform well when implemented in McEliece. As k continues to grow large, the discrepancy
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between 2k− 1 and (k+12 ) becomes greater and greater. For this reason, we wish to modify the
code in some way that improves Schur sqaure dimension.
Single-Twist Reed-Solomon Codes
In order to increase the dimension of the Schur square, mathematicians Beelen, Puchinger,
and Nielsen (2017) introduce the concept of twisted Reed-Solomon codes. We use the term twist
to indicate an increase in the degree of the largest basis element.
Definition 16. Let k, t, h, η ∈ Z with 0 ≤ h < k, η ≥ 1, and t > 0. Then
Lk,t,h,η =
{ k−1∑
i=0,i̸=h
aixi + ah(xh + ηxk−1+t) : ai ∈ F
}
= span{1, x, . . . , xk−1, . . . , xh + ηxk−1+t},
and the twisted Reed-Solomon code is defined to be Ck,t,h,η = ev(Lk,t,h,η).
Parameters. Twisted Reed-Solomon codes are not necessarily MDS for all k, t, h, and η
but can be MDS for certain parameters. Given that the highest degree is n− (k− 1+ t), we can
make a conjecture as to what the minimum distance may be. In order to find the minimum
distance, we can determine the minimum weight of the evaluation of f over the subspace Lk. Since
the maximum degree is k− 1+ t, this is also the maximum possible number of distinct roots.
Therefore, it is possible that wt(ev(f)) = d ≥ n− (k− 1+ t), but this has not yet been proven.
Examples of twisted Reed-Solomon codes. In order to demonstrate how twisting
Reed-Solomon codes improves their suitability, consider the following series of examples.
Example 17. We will first compute the Schur square for a standard, untwisted Reed-Solomon
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code. Let k = 5. Since L5 = span{1, x, ..., x4}, it follows that
C25 = ev(span{1, x, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8}).
Observe that dim C25 = 9. However, because k = 5, we know that for the code to appear random,
we need the dimension of the Schur square to be
(k+1
2
)
= (5)(6)2 = 15. Obviously, 9 < 15, and we
fall short of this standard.
Example 18. Next, consider a twisted Reed-Solomon code as defined above. Let F5 = Z/5Z,
k = 5, and t = 2, and consider the case when h is not used (indicated by a subscript of 0) and
η = 1. Then
Lk,t,h,η = L5,2,0,1 = span{1, x, x2, x3, x4, x5−1+2} = span{1, x, x2, x3, x4, x6},
and C5,2,0,1 = ev(L5,2,0,1). Computing the Schur square, we have
L25,2,0,1 = span{1, x, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x12}.
From this, we see that dim C25,2,0,1 = 12. Since h = η = 0, we do not have any elements added
together in the basis. However, we still have a jump from x4 to x6. Given that k = 5, 2k− 1 = 9,
this is still an improvement. Unfortunately, it does not meet the ideal standard of
(6
2
)
= 15.
Example 19. Now consider the twisted Reed-Solomon Code where F5 = Z/5Z, k = 5, t = 2,
h = 3, and η = 1. Then Lk,t,h,η = L5,2,3,1 = span{1, x, x2, x4, x3 + x6}, and
Ck,t,h,η = C5,2,3,1 = ev(L5,2,3,1).
Computing the Schur square, we find that
L25,4,3,1 = span{1, x, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x8, x3 + x6, x4 + x7, x5 + x8, x7 + x10, x6 + 2x9 + x12}.
CODES, CRYPTOGRAPHY, AND MCELIECE 21
Thus, dim C25,2,3,1 = 13. We see that twisting the code, then, does improve the dimension of the
Schur square over merely jumping up in degree. Again, however, it still does not meet ideal
standard.
Reed-Solomon subcode and supercode relations. By observation, it is clear that the
twisted codes have elements that are distinct from their untwisted counterparts. To understand the
relationship between the two, we consider the following example.
Example 20. Let n = 5, k = 5, and t = 2. Then F = Z5. Consider the code obtained by simply
adding the values of k and t. Notice
L7 = L5+2 = span{1, x, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6},
where Ck+t = C7 = ev(L7).
Now, add the conditions h = 0 and η = 1, and consider the resulting twisted
Reed-Solomon code. Previously, we saw that
Lk,t,h,η = L5,2,0,1 = span{1, x, x2, x3, x4, x5−1+2} = span{1, x, x2, x3, x4, x6},
with Ck,t,h,η = C5,2,0,1 = ev(L5,2,0,1). Therefore, since every element of the basis for C5,2,0,1 is also
an element of the basis for C7, it follows that C5,2,0,1 ⊆ C7.
Next, recall that
L5,2,3,1 = span{1, x, x2, x4, x3 + x6},
and Ck,t,h,η = C5,2,3,1 = ev(C5,2,3,1). Again, every element of the basis for C5,2,3,1 is contained in
C5,2,0,1. Thus, C5,2,3,1 ⊆ C5,2,0,1 ⊆ C7.
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While it may seem as though we should be able to continue creating subset relations for
η ̸= 1, this is unfortunately not the case. Suppose that η = c ∈ N with c ̸= 0 and c ̸= 1. Then
Lk,t,h,η will have a basis element of the form xh + cxk−1+t. At best, Lk,t,h,1 contains xh + xk−1+t.
Thus, Ck,t,h,c ⊈ Ck,t,h,1 for all c ̸= 0, 1. However, we will always have that
Ck,t,h,η ⊆ Ck,t,0,1 ⊆ Ck+t.
Multi-Twist Reed-Solomon Codes
In a subsequent paper, Beelen et al. (2018) generalize further by introducing
Reed-Solomon codes with multiple twists.
Definition 21. Let ℓ ∈ N, and let η = (ηi), t = (ti),h = (hi) ∈ Zℓ. Require 0 < ti ≤ n− k and
0 ≤ hi < k, with ti’s and hi’s distinct. Then
Lk,t,h,η =

k−1∑
i=0
i̸=h
aixi +
l∑
j=1
ahj(xhj + ηjxk−1+tj) : ai ∈ F

= span{1, x, . . . , xk−1, . . . , xh1 + η1xk−1+t1 , . . . , xhl + ηlxk−1+tl}.
Note that η = (η1, . . . , ηℓ), h = (h1, . . . , hℓ) and t = (t1, . . . , tℓ).
Now, rather than simply letting η, t, h ∈ Z, we have η, t,h ∈ Zℓ, where ℓ is the desired
number of twists in the code. To illustrate this concept, consider the following example.
Example 22. Let q = 5, k = 5, t = (2, 4),h = (1, 3), and η = (2, 3). Then
L5,(2,4),(1,3),(2,3) = span{1, x2, x4, x+ 2x6, x3 + 3x8},
and C5,(2,4),(1,3),(2,3) = ev(L5,(2,4),(1,3),(2,3)).
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Parameters. As with standard Reed-Solomon codes, multi-twist Reed-Solomon codes
have length n and dimension k. Currently, the minimum distance has not been determined.
Suitability for the McEliece cryptosystem. As the number of twists increases,
calculations become significantly more tedious by hand. Yet, Beelen et al. (2018) conclude that
the Schur square of multi-twist Reed-Solomon codes is often large. However, the dimension does
not necessarily reach the desired
(k+1
2
)
, and so the codes may be susceptible to several different
structural attacks. In search of a family of codes that may come closer to a Schur square
dimension of
(k+1
2
)
, we now consider an entirely different type of code.
Hermitian Codes
In order to define Hermitian codes, we must first define an equivalence relation of
F3q\{(0, 0, 0)}.
Definition 23. Given (a, b, c), (e, f, g) ∈ F3q, we say (a, b, c) ∼ (e, f, g) if (a, b, c) = (λe, λf, λg)
for some λ ∈ Fq\{0}. We write (a : b : c) for the equivalence class of (a, b, c).
Definition 24. The projective plane is given by P2(Fq) = (F3q\{(0, 0, 0)})/ ∼. The affine plane,
F2q, is in 1-1 correspondence with the classes (a : b : c) ∈ P2(Fq) with c ̸= 0 under the mapping
(a, b) 7→ (a : b : 1).
A class (a : b : c) ∈ P2(Fq) is said to be a point at infinity if c = 0.
In 1988 Stichtenoth introduced one-point Hermitian codes, which are algebraic geometry
codes based on Hermitian curves. First, we define the pole order of xiyj at P∞ to be
δ(xiyj) = iq+ j(q+ 1). For future use, it is important to note that if the functions f1, . . . , fn have
distinct pole orders, then they are linearly independent.
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Definition 25. Hermitian codes are defined to be
C(αP∞) = {(f(P1), . . . , f(Pn)) : f ∈ L(P∞)}, where
L(αP∞) = span{xiyj : 0 ≤ i, 0 ≤ j ≤ q− 1, δ(xiyj) ≤ α},
and P1, . . . ,Pn are the points on the projective plane over Fq2 that satisfy the equation
yqz+ yzq = xq+1. Thus, this code can be defined as the image of the evaluation map,
ev : L(αP∞) → Fnq2 ,
f 7→ (f(P1), . . . , f(Pn)).
Notice that C(αP∞) is then a code of length n = q3, dimension at least α + 1− q(q−1)2 ,
with equality achieved when α ≥ q(q− 1) + 1. Note that if α < n, then Hermitian codes have
dimension exactly k = dim(L(αP)) and have a minimum distance of d ≥ n− α.
Consider the following examples of Hermitian codes.
Example 26. Let q = 3 and α = 8, then
L(8P∞) = span{1, x, y, x2, xy, y2}.
We know that y2 is the largest element to be included in the basis as y2 = x0y2 implies i = 0,
j = 2, and 0(3) + 2(3+ 1) = 8 ≤ 8 = α. However, x3 = x3y0 implies i = 3, j = 0, and
3(3) + 0(3+ 1) = 9 ≰ 8 = α.
Example 27. Let q = 3 and α = 12. Following the same pattern as the previous example, we
have
L(12P∞) = span{1, x, y, x2, xy, y2, xy2, x3, x2y}.
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Schur Square
Although one-point Hermitian codes provide valuable insight into the McEliece
cryptosystem, they have many shortcomings. Most notably, the Schur Square dimension of a
Hermitian code is significantly lower than the desired dimension of
( k+1
2
)
. More specifically,
dimC(αP∞)2 ≤ 2α + 1− g. This is due to the fact that the multiplications of certain elements do
not always result in elements that are linearly independent from the already existing elements. To
illustrate this point, consider the following example.
Example 28. Let q = 5, and consider L(12P) = span{1, x, y, x2, xy, y2}. Counting the basis
elements, we find k = 6. With this value of k, we have
(k+1
2
)
= 21. Computing the Schur square,
we have
L(12P)2 = span{1, x, y, x2, xy, y2, . . . , x2y2, xy3, y4}.
Counting the basis elements, we find k = 15. While not terribly low, this dimension is clearly less
than the desired Schur square dimension.
Schur square distinguishing, a structural attack introduced by Couvreur, Gaborit,
Gauthier-Umaña, Otmani, and Tillich (2014), is effective against one-point Hermitian codes by
exploiting the low Schur square dimension of one-point Hermitian codes. To retain many
desirable qualities of one-point Hermitian codes while fortifying a Hermitian-based McEliece
variant, we introduce a new family of codes called multi-twisted Hermitian codes.
Multi-Twisted Hermitian Codes
Inspired by the ideas of Beelen et al. (2017) we adapt one-point Hermitian codes and
define multi-twisted Hermitian codes.
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Definition 29. Let ℓ = 2n and t = ((r1, s1), . . . , (rℓ, sℓ)) ∈
(
(Z \ {0})2
)n
be a vector of ℓ distinct
non-zero ordered pairs of integers satisfying uq+ v(q+ 1) < (u+ rk)q+ (v+ sk)(q+ 1),
∀k = 1, . . . , ℓ. Let h = ((a1, b1), . . . , (rℓ, sℓ)) ∈
(
Z2
)n be a vector of ℓ distinct ordered pairs of
integers satisfying akq+ bk(q+ 1) ≤ uq+ v(q+ 1) and bk ≤ q− 1. Let
η = (η1, . . . , ηℓ) ∈ {Fq2 \ 0}ℓ. The set of (t,h, η)-twisted bivariate polynomials is
Bt,h,η(αP∞) =
(
B(αP∞) \
ℓ⋃
k=1
{
xakybk
}) ∪ ℓ⋃
k=1
{
xakybk + ηkxu+rkyv+sk
}
.
Let Lt,h,η(αP∞) = span{Bt,h,η(αP∞)}.
Notice that
Lt,h,η(αP∞) =

⌊ αq⌋∑
i=0
⌊ α−iqq+1 ⌋∑
j=0
ci,jxiyj +
ℓ∑
k=1
ηkcak,bkxu+rkyv+sk
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ci,j ∈ Fq2
 .
The ℓ-twisted Hermitian code Ct,h,η(αP∞) is Ct,h,η(αP∞) = evβq (Lt,h,η) ⊆ Fnq2 .
To see how twists impact the dimension of the Schur square, we present a final example.
Example 30. As before, let q = 5. Begin with the untwisted basis
L(12P) = span{1, x, y, x2, xy, y2}. Let h = ((2, 0), (1, 1), (0, 2)) and t = ((4,−1), (7, 0), (10, 1)).
We then have
Lt,h,η(12P) = span{1, x, y, x2 + x4y, xy+ x7y2, y2 + x10y3}.
Counting the basis elements, we again have k = 6. Thus, we desire a Schur square dimension of(6+1
2
)
= 21. While the calculation is tedious, we indeed find
dim Lt,h,η(12P)2 = 21.
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Schur Square Dimension
Recall that a one-point Hermitian code C(αP∞) has relatively low Schur square
dimension. It can be shown that an ℓ-twisted Hermitian code Cn,kt,h,η(αP∞) possesses a larger lower
bound on Schur square dimension. Specifically,
dimCn,kt,h,η(αP∞) ≥
(
k+ 1
2
)
− g,
where g = q(q−1)2 . Previously, we noted that dimC(αP∞)
2 ≤ 2α + 1− g.
Conclusion
Overall, we have defined a new family of codes, multi-twist Hermitian codes, whose
construction is based on the one-point Hermitian code. The length and dimension of the new
codes is the same as the one-point Hermitian code. However, these new codes attain a Schur
square dimension larger than that of the corresponding one-point Hermitian code. When more
rigorous requirements are implemented, it is possible for a sub-family of these codes to achieve
an extremely large Schur square dimension, close to that of a random linear code. Codes of this
sub-family are resistant to Schur square distinguishing when implemented within the McEliece
cryptosystem, yet they retain the same key size as when one-point Hermitian codes are used.
Thus, twisted Hermitian codes can provide a higher level of security than standard Hermitian
codes and have great potential for future use when implemented in the McEliece cryptosystem.
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